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What Lincoln Was Up Against:  The Context of Leadership 
Edward L. Ayers 
 
In the bicentennial of Abraham Lincoln’s birth, we justly celebrate his character, 
ideals, and strategies, finding new depths in his virtues.  It is tempting to imagine that the 
halting and hard-won evolution of Lincoln’s ideas and strategies on emancipation marked 
the moral growth of white America during the Civil War.  But that story, implict and 
explicit in many portrayals of Lincoln, embodied in our monuments to him and enscribed 
in our favorite quotations, underestimates Lincoln’s greatest accomplishment.   
Abraham Lincoln faced desperate challenges from the moment he took office 
until the day he was killed.  While Union armies in the field struggled for four years 
against dismayingly effective Confederate forces, Lincoln fought to keep the North from 
breaking apart.  The task proved unrelenting.  Abolitionists and Radical Republicans 
pressed Lincoln to act more boldly against slavery while many Democrats swore, start to 
finish, that they would not fight a war on behalf of black Americans.  
Lincoln could never be confident that the gains he won would long endure—or 
would even endure through the next election.  Despite his eloquence and skill, and 
despite the Union’s growing success on the battlefield, white public opinion in the North 
refused to consolidate behind Lincoln’s leadership on the key issue of black Americans 
and their future.  A wary egalitarianism among some Republicans early in the war grew 
into genuine respect for black Americans, especially black soldiers, but in turn Democrats 
developed ever more contemptuous and systematic arguments and rhetoric against black 
people.  The Republicans, as a matter of political calculation if nothing else, talked of 
	 2
black Americans cautiously and intermittently.  The Democrats, by contrast, sneered and 
raged about “negroes” at every opportunity and found receptive audiences across the 
North whether events on the battlefield went well or not.  The war divided the white 
North ever deeper even as black freedom grew closer, compromising reconstruction 
before it ever began.   
As much as we would like to imagine that the eloquent words from the 
Gettysburg Address and the Second Inaugural spoke for a white North made greater and 
more self-aware through the sacrifices of the Civil War, those words do not seem to have 
penetrated very deeply into the consciousness of those not already inclined to agree with 
them.  Lincoln’s great speeches, when not ignored, were ridiculed and dismissed by his 
many enemies.  His words gained their resonance in decades and generations that 
followed, when the nation told the story of the Civil War back to itself, trying to make the 
shattering experience coherent and whole.i 
None of this diminishes Abraham Lincoln.  His actions against slavery, driven by 
military necessity, outran his commitment to black Americans early on, but his faith and 
understanding grew as he witnessed the bravery of African American soldiers and as 
enslaved people made clear their determination to be free, regardless of the cost.  Lincoln 
grew morally over the course of the war and he shared that growing understanding in 
ever more eloquent words.  Lincoln’s most important triumph lay, however, in leading 
the nation to a place many did not choose to go, in navigating through the political, 
ideological, and emotional minefield that was wartime America.  Though Democrats and 
other opponents fought against white Southerners on the battlefield and believed in the 
Union, they shared white Southerners’ views of black Americans.  They did not undergo 
	 3
a conversion experience in the Civil War, despite the often lonely and brave eloquence of 
Abraham Lincoln.  
Lincoln realized better than anyone how much public opinion mattered.  “In this 
age, and this country, public sentiment is every thing,” he said.  “With it, nothing can fail; 
against it, nothing can succeed.  Whoever moulds public sentiment, goes deeper than he 
who enacts statutes, or pronounces judicial decisions.”  If we want a clear sense of 
Lincoln’s actual accomplishments, then, we must deal with public opinion more 
systematically than we have.  There were no opinion polls in the nineteenth century, but 
votes and words give us a good sense of what changed and what did not.ii 
 Americans—even generals and presidents—understood the larger shape and 
meaning of the Civil War through printed words.  Only a tiny fraction would have seen or 
heard Abraham Lincoln and most white Northerners would never have seen an enslaved 
person or a battlefield.  The war came in long gray columns of text, chosen and framed 
by local editors.  A new system of telegraph stations, railroads, and press organizations 
spread words with unprecedented speed and in enormous quantity.  Reports from the 
battlefield poured out in brief messages and long torrents, editorials commenting on 
every event and utterance.  As desperate as the war was, and as bitterly as people 
disagreed, the Lincoln administration largely allowed the opposition press to say what it 
wished.iii   
 The bland appearance of the newspapers belied the passions within.  The things 
people wrote about, the words they habitually paired, the ideals they named, the slurs 
they cast—all were strongly patterned.  No matter how passionate they might be, no 
matter how unique the situation might appear, people returned time and again to the same 
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words to express themselves.  The patterns those key words made became as distinct as 
fingerprints. 
 We are just beginning to learn how to use new tools that allow us to see these 
patterns in the vast amount of text produced in wartime America.  An increasing number 
of newspapers are being translated into digital form and offer exciting new ways to 
understand some of the most written-about subjects in American history.  As we begin to 
think about what this kind of history might look like, perhaps we can take our bearings 
from four newspapers based in places that embodied within themselves many of the 
struggles the nation experienced.  Two counties—Augusta in Virginia and Franklin in 
Pennsylvania—lay about two hundred miles apart in the Great Valley that stood as a 
major corridor of trade, migration, and war.  We know a great deal about those two 
counties, embodied in a large digital archive, and we know that their experiences and 
expressions, while unique in their particulars, echoed those used by people across the 
United States and the Confederacy.iv  
 Each county sustained two newspapers over the era of the sectional conflict.  
Augusta County supported a paper that had been strongly Unionist before the war and 
another that had inclined toward secession.  Franklin County supported a Republican 
paper and a Democratic paper.  Together, these newspapers staked out the four corners of 
white public opinion, North and South, before, during, and after the Civil War.  
Gathering articles from other papers from all over the United States, including those they 
detested, those papers reflected and shaped their readers’ opinions week by week.  They 
carried the ever-changing currents and temperature of public sentiment.  
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 A matrix of the most commonly used key words in the four newspapers, drawn 
from hundreds of thousands of words across the years between 1859 and 1870, maps the 
dominant patterns in the language people read week in and week out.  [illustration 1]  The 
North and the South shared more than it might seem possible for two warring entities to 
share.  Northerners talked of rebels while Southerners talked of the enemy, but otherwise 
their newspapers spoke in the same elemental language. They saw the world through the 
same lenses of the constitution and government.  They believed that the people held 
sacred rights that had to be defended.  Protecting those rights was their duty, to be upheld 
by their honor.  They believed they were fighting for freedom.   
 No obvious cultural differences appear in these papers.  Honor appears as at least 
as much a Northern value as a Southern, freedom as much as Southern value a Northern.  
Northerners and Southerners framed their Civil War in political terms that became 
personal terms. They spoke the same language of loyalty and sacrifice.  When they spoke 
of duty they accompanied that word with powerful correlates:  imperative, solemn, 
patriotic, owe, and discharge.  When they spoke of honor, they spoke of integrity, glory, 
sacrifice, and brave.  Larger purposes and private purposes became one and the same. 
They appealed to the same God in an identical language of supplication.  They spoke of 
Almighty God and thanked Him and blessed Him and trusted Him.  They begged for His 
speed and help.  They stood before Providence and hoped they might serve as 
instruments of divine will.v 
 And yet Northerners and Southerners, speaking exactly the same language of war, 
killed each other in ever-escalating numbers.  Precisely because they shared a vocabulary 
and all the history it embodied, the North and the South hated those on the other side with 
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a hatred all the deeper for being directed at people so like themselves.  The North and the 
South fought so bitterly because they fought for a shared patrimony. 
 Most striking and significant are the differences within the North.  Franklin 
County affords a revealing perspective on the internal struggles that determined whether 
Lincoln would succeed or fail.  The Republican paper in Franklin came to be edited by 
the head of the Republican Party in Pennsylvania, one of Lincoln’s earliest and strongest 
supporters.  Franklin County voted for Lincoln in 1860 in exactly the proportion he won 
across the North:  56 percent.  The Democrats’ paper, by contrast, spoke very clearly in 
the distinctive idiom of that party, an idiom heard all across the Union, an idiom of race 
and outrage against everything Republican.  Democrats in Franklin proudly proclaimed 
their county the boyhood home of former Democratic President James Buchanan and 
deployed the Democrats’ vocabulary of vitriol with force and fluency.   
 Northern politicians and editors inhabited a world of harsh words, shifting 
alliances, and desperate gambles.  That world had been unsettled throughout the 1850s 
and Lincoln could win the presidency with a new party because the old parties fractured 
and exploded.  The Democrats split at their convention and put two competitors in the 
field in 1860; then a new Constitutional Union joined the fight, leaving Lincoln and his 
fledgling Republican Party to take office with only 40 percent of the votes cast.  A map 
of voting in 1860 shows that not only did voters in the future Confederacy leave Lincoln 
off their ballots, but men voted against him in large areas of the states, free and slave, that 
would remain in the Union.  In counties across the North, Lincoln often won narrow 
victories even in states he carried.   [ill. 2] 
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War descended before Lincoln had a chance to win over the Democrats or the 
Constitutional Unionists, before he had a chance to show what sort of leader he would be. 
Northern Democrats stood with Lincoln at the beginning of the war when they imagined 
that a brief conflict would restore the Union.  When he issued the Preliminary 
Emancipation Proclamation in 1862, however, the Democrats proclaimed that Lincoln 
had handed the Confederacy a great gift.  The entire white South, they warned, would 
now be unified as it had never been unified before.  Jefferson Davis, the Democrats’ 
paper in Franklin declared, “would have given the last dollar in the Confederate Treasury 
to have just such a proclamation emanate from the President of the United States.”  There 
was truth to the claim.  The Confederacy, fractious on the home front, solidified in the 
face of the Proclamation.vi 
 The local and state elections that followed the Preliminary Emancipation 
Proclamation in 1862 gave voters across the North a chance to express their opinions on 
Lincoln’s policies.  Many moderate Republicans accepted the proclamation as the war 
aim it was.  Democrats, by contrast, declared that the election that followed would be 
“the most important one that has occurred in the history of our country.”  The issue, as 
they saw it, was clear:  “Abolitionism threatens the overthrow of the Constitution, the 
disruption of the Union and the elevation of the negro to an equality with the white man.”  
The true men of the Democracy thus had to fight two evils at once.  “Whilst the army of 
the Republic is crushing out Secessionism in the field, do not forget that you have a duty 
to perform by voting down Abolitionism at the Polls.”vii 
 In the state and local elections of 1862 and 1863, the Democrats stormed back.  
Five of the most important states Lincoln had carried in 1860—New York, Pennsylvania, 
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Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois—sent Democratic majorities to Congress.  The Republicans  
held on to their small edge in the House of Representatives only because large and loyal 
Republican majorities turned out in New England and in the border states where the 
Union army maintained a presence.  If the presidency had been at stake in 1862, and if 
voters had cast ballots for president as they did for state officials, Lincoln would have 
lost, 127 electoral votes to 86.viii 
The election returns of 1862 hung as a threat over the coming months.  Should the 
Lincoln administration fail to crush the rebellion, Democrats warned, “the Democratic 
party will, when it gets hold of the reins of Government, use all power, and all the 
statesmanship it can muster to its aid, to restore the Constitution in its ancient spirit and 
vigor.”  That meant restoring the South to the Union and restoring the constitutional right 
of slavery.  Given the opportunity, the Democrats would seize power and then “reunite 
our shattered and bleeding Union, as it was before the reckless fanaticism and 
uncompromising, revengeful spirit of the present day severed the holy bonds which 
bound us in one brotherhood.”   The crusade against slavery, in other words, would come 
to an end.ix 
 The defeats and delays of the United States army in 1862 and the first half of 
1863, coupled with a draft, growing taxes, and unpopular laws, threatened to break the 
North from within.  The South smothered its political divisions, but the North paraded its 
differences in one election after another.  The Democrats refused to let up on Abraham 
Lincoln, refused to soften criticism of generals and their failures, refused to accept that 
emancipation might become a principal war aim or that the war would be prolonged to 
bring slavery to an end.  The Democrats filled newspapers with their denunciations and 
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attracted voters to the polls in undiminished numbers despite Republican calls for 
wartime unity.  “Party” was second only to “people” as the word most commonly used in 
both newspapers of Franklin County. 
 Lincoln issued a draft call for half a million more men in July 1864.  Since the 
draft came on the eve of important state elections in Ohio, Indiana, and Pennsylvania, 
conscription threatened the greatest blow yet against the prospects of Union victory.  The 
Democrats smelled blood and went on the attack:  “In short his administration has cost 
the nation one million men and three thousand million dollars, leaving the country in a 
tenfold worse condition than it was on the day he assumed the chair of State,” the party’s 
Franklin paper spat, “and it is fair to presume that four years more of the imbecility, 
corruption and fanaticism that have prevailed during the last three would result in, not 
only the complete ruin and exhaustion of the country, but in division, and the total 
overthrow of republican institutions. Will the people try the experiment?  We trust not.”  
By August, prominent Republicans had concluded that Lincoln would be defeated.  Their 
only hope, many believed, was to nominate a different candidate. "Nobody here doubts 
it,” one admitted to Lincoln.  “Nor do I see anybody from other states who authorizes the 
slightest hope of success.” x   
 The political parties warred in the North in 1864 while the armies warred on the 
battlefield.  Although the Democrats were profoundly disorganized, hobbled by 
desperately competing factions, no national leader, and no national patronage, the party 
found wide support across the North.  Not only did many white voters hate the idea of 
abolition and dread the idea of free black people, but they also hated what they saw as the 
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tyranny of the Lincoln administration, with high taxes, conscription, and rationing of the 
news from the battlefields.xi   
 The Republicans managed to submerge their differences long enough to 
renominate Lincoln, but to signal their central purpose to skeptical voters they changed 
their name to the Union Party and nominated a former Democrat, Andrew Johnson of 
Tennessee, for the Vice Presidency.  Lincoln held many advantages and he used 
patronage adroitly to discipline his splintered party.  Voters in occupied areas of 
Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri, where the Republicans had barely appeared in 1860, 
voted for Lincoln.  So did voters in the new states of West Virginia, Nevada, and Kansas, 
while popular Republican projects such as the Homestead Act won support for the party 
in the West.  For the first time, too, soldiers in the field voted and about three-fourths of 
the million who cast ballots voted supported their commander-in-chief.  
 Despite these advantages and crucial military victories in Georgia and Virginia on 
the eve of the election, Lincoln won 55 percent of the vote in 1864.  That is considered a 
landslide in American politics, but it nevertheless meant that nearly half of all voters 
refused to support the president even in the desperation of wartime.  Though the election 
signaled that the North under Lincoln would fight until Confederate surrender, Lincoln’s 
overall share of the vote barely changed between 1860 and 1864.  Even after the most 
important victories in the Civil War and after the Emancipation Proclamation and the 
Gettysburg Address, even with all the power of the patronage and vast government 
spending at his command, even in the middle of an enormous war commanding the 
loyalty of an immense army of soldiers, Lincoln began his second term with nearly half 
the electorate opposed to him.xii  [ill. 3]  
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 Lincoln remained as president because the Electoral College created a convincing 
mandate from a narrow popular difference, just as it was designed to do.  He won because 
the two-party system suppressed fragmentation and dissent and because fixed election 
cycles prevented his opponents from seizing moments of despair and crisis to launch 
challenges to him.  All across the North, in one county after another, Lincoln won only 
by a few dozen votes, by a small percentage of the electorate.  In 1864 Franklin County, 
like many others across the North, shifted toward the Democrats even as it stayed in the 
Republican column.  Lincoln won Franklin by 47 votes out of over 7,000 cast, just as he 
won Pennsylvania by the narrowest of margins. [ill 4]   
 General histories of the Civil War and biographers of Lincoln acknowledge the 
challenge of 1864 and the sudden turn at the end, of course, but they emphasize that the 
victory at the polls removed the Confederates’ last hope of a negotiated peace.  While 
true, such a perspective leaves out a crucial part of the story going forward, creating the 
impression that matters had been settled in public opinion, that the white North had been 
converted to Lincoln’s shifting perspective on the future of black Americans.   If we 
remember the narrowness of Lincoln’s reelection, however, and focus on the enduring 
bitterness and opposition across the North, the tortured history of the next decade is less 
surprising than it often appears.  It was not that the white North converted for an 
egalitarian moment and then betrayed that conversion.  The white North ended the war 
even more divided than it began. 
 Throughout the war, start to finish, the language of race provided the most 
contested and charged words.  In the two years before the war began, the papers of 
Franklin County talked incessantly about “negroes.”  The constellation of words 
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associated with “negro” in 1859, 1860, and early 1861 shows that the Republicans talked 
of slavery in the territories while the Democrats talked of John Brown and Harpers Ferry, 
trying to saddle their opponents with insurrection.  The word “nigger” appears 
prominently in the Republican paper mainly because that paper quoted and taunted the 
Democrats for their discouragingly effective fixation on race.  “Because of their continual 
feasting upon their colored brethren, with ‘nigger’ for breakfast, ‘darkey’ for lunch, 
‘cuffy’ for dinner, ‘woolly head’ for desert, and ‘sambo’ for supper, we have arrived at 
the conclusion that their true name should be the Nigger Democracy,” the Republican 
paper charged in 1860.  “Notwithstanding the nauseating character of the dish, and the 
frequency with which they thrust the unsavory repast under the noses of their readers, we 
find that they still rehash the old, mouldy collation.”  The Republicans preferred to talk of 
white men instead of black.xiii [ill. 5] 
 Over the course of the war, the Democrats invoked “negroes” over and over 
again, especially at election time and especially as the end of slavery became ever clearer. 
The Republicans spoke positively of black soldiers, but they did not dwell on slavery or 
black people in general until the war had been won and Lincoln reelected.  Instead, they 
talked of the obligations and opportunities of white people.  They talked of the necessity 
of winning the war, of saving the Union.   [ill. 6] 
 The most frequently used words during the war years reveal the priorities of the 
newspapers of both sides.  [ill. 7]  Northerners talked the most of “rebels” and 
Southerners talked the most of the “enemy.”  Everyone dwelled on the wounds suffered 
by their neighbors, relatives, and friends.  They carefully scrutinized the people of both 
sides, continually monitoring their opinion, their morale, their determination.  They 
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recognized that opinion in the North crystallized in parties and used “party” as a 
shorthand way of defining the tendencies they celebrated or deplored.  They considered 
their fundamental rights to be at stake, knew that rights were protected by the 
government, and owed a duty to protect those rights in every way they could.  The 
language of the war, in other words, focused on war-making and the rights that white 
people on both sides considered their birthright.   
 The word “slavery,” prominent on the eve of the war, fell into relative disuse by 
the Republicans as well as the Democrats. As Frederick Douglass complained, “Slavery, 
though wounded, dying and despised, is still able to bind the tongues of our republican 
orators,” he told an abolitionist ally.  “The Negro is the deformed child, which is put out 
of the room when company comes.”  Lincoln himself spoke only obliquely about slavery 
in his famous 1863 speech at Gettysburg and said little about slavery over the following 
year as the election loomed.xiv    
 Often portrayed as a pivotal event in the nation’s history, the Gettysburg Address 
in fact passed with little notice.  The new national cemetery at Gettysburg lay only thirty 
miles from Franklin’s seat, but the Republican paper gave Lincoln’s now-famous address 
only a small share of the attention.  Instead, the paper gushed over Edward Everett, 
“America's greatest living orator,” who “for two hours held the crowd in one of the most 
splendid intellectual efforts of his life.”  Saying only that “the dedicatory remarks were 
then delivered by the President, as follows,” the paper printed the brief words of 
Lincoln’s speech—as they did of a song by the Baltimore Glee Club—doing what 
Republican papers across the North did.  Democrats, for their part, considered the speech 
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a campaign maneuver from the outset and treated it with contempt.  Any notion that the 
speech marked a turning point in white opinion is wishful thinking.xv  
 Destroying slavery became United States military policy even though many white 
Northerners never came to believe that the war was worth fighting to end slavery.  
Slavery came to an end not because white Northerners changed their minds but because 
white Southerners forced slavery to be destroyed.  As one Republican in Franklin put it, 
“Slavery is now dying, not by the hands of those who long since favored a prohibitory 
constitutional amendment, not by the hands of abolitionists so called, not by virtue 
entirely of the executive proclamation, but by war, cruel war, provoked and made by its 
friend.”xvi 
Many white Republicans, however, both soldiers on the field and at home, in 
Franklin as elsewhere, came to understand slavery more fully as they fought against 
slavery and as they admired black soldiers’ bravery.  Channels of empathy and human 
understanding began to open.  Some white Northerners became attuned to things they had 
not been attuned to before, bridges of common humanity.  Men and women who came to 
see the humanity of black Southerners would, in coming years, give much of themselves 
as teachers, advocates, and allies of the former slaves.  But such white Northerners did 
not dominate public discourse; their heroism grew by action and individual commitment, 
often in the face of hostility and indifference, not by default.  
An issue of the Republican paper in Franklin County in February 1865 shows the 
depth of new understanding by some whites.  One article heralded the end of slavery and 
the beginning of a new life for black Americans.  “At last the Nation is disenthralled from 
its crowning crime.  Slavery, the fruitful parent of all the staggering woes of the 
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Republic—the deadly foe of the very genius of our free institutions, and the author of the 
bloody fraternal conflict that has crimsoned our fair fields by the most appalling 
sacrifices, has, in the fullness of His time, fallen beneath the retributive stroke of Justice,” 
the paper exulted as the Thirteenth Amendment passed.  Looking ahead, it spoke 
paternalistically but with good will.  “What may be done with the African race in the 
future we cannot tell.  We know they have capacity, and this being the land of their birth, 
our duty is with the present.  That they have giants among them even in their degraded 
condition does not admit of a doubt. In this broad land of ours, under the blessing of our 
Government, they can be made useful to themselves, the country and posterity.  Let the 
effort be fairly made.”  Such things would not have been said in a Republican newspaper 
four years earlier, perhaps not even two years earlier.xvii 
But the Democrats would have nothing of it.  When Lincoln was inaugurated for 
his second term in the spring of 1865, the Democrats’ paper in Franklin spoke of the 
nation’s leader with disdain.  His Second Inaugural speech, later considered the greatest 
he ever delivered and the greatest inaugural speech in our history, “has been looked for 
by the public with less interest than is usually exhibited, even in ordinary times, in regard 
to a public expression from the pen or lips of a President of the United States. The 
indifference is attributable, probably, to the fact that the people know too well how 
utterly his practice has been at variance with the professions he made in his first 
inaugural, to have any confidence in his utterances now.”  The editor pretended to think 
that Lincoln might apologize for violating the Constitution and for his “abandonment of 
principles which he had solemnly put forth as his rule of conduct.  In lieu of any such 
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attempt, however, he has given us the mere trash to which we refer our readers as 
unworthy of comment.”  In sum, “He had nothing to say, and he has said it.”xviii 
 It is hard to read these words now.  We know that the Democrats were profoundly 
wrong about the meaning of the history they were living.  But we must recognize that 
many white Americans—the great majority, in fact, if the white South is added to the 
nearly half of the white North who voted against Lincoln in 1864—would have agreed 
with them.  The aftermath of the war, with its abandoned Reconstruction, reflected a 
consistent ideological, racial, and political opposition before, during, and after the Civil 
War.   
The words associated with “negro” over the five years following the war give a 
glimpse of what was to come.  The intersection of politics, rights, and race  proved to be 
the most volatile combination in the universe of white American men in the mid-
nineteenth century.  “Radicals” and “Democrats” replaced “enemy” and “rebel” as the 
most charged words.  Democrats obsessed over any possibility of black voting, talking of 
suffrage, equality, vote, and supremacy whenever they mentioned the word “negro.”  [ill. 
8]  The very things the Democrats had been fighting for—political rights for white men 
and all the identity as white men that went with those rights—flowed into a toxic and 
volatile mix.  As much as the Democrats had fixated on black people before and during 
the war, they doubled their obsession after the war ended.xix   
 White Northerners disagreed with each other more deeply at the end of the war 
than at the beginning.  From start to finish, Abraham Lincoln struggled with the most 
progressive as well as the most retrograde factions.  As Frederick Douglass would write a 
decade later, “Viewed from genuine abolition ground, Mr. Lincoln seemed tardy, cold, 
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dull, and indifferent; but measuring him by the sentiment of his country, a sentiment he 
was bound as a statesman to consult, he was swift, zealous, radical, and determined.”xx  
In such a context, Abraham Lincoln’s leadership lay in capturing what he could from 
each moment of possibility, of avoiding the worst in each moment of disaster.  His 
leadership lay in doing less than many wanted, later than many wanted, in less dramatic 
ways than many wanted.  He worked at the very edge of public opinion, repeatedly 
testing its boundaries and its strength.  In the end, Lincoln led his nation through an 
unimaginably costly war to a redemptive outcome, ending the largest system of slavery in 
the modern world in a victory that many of his fellow white Americans resisted every 
step of the way. 
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i See Gabor Boritt, The Gettysburg Gospel:  The Lincoln Speech That Nobody Knows 
(New York:  Simon and Schuster, 2006), pp. 191-2. 
ii See Menahem Blondheim, “’Public Sentiment is Everything’:  The Union’s Public 
Communications Strategy and the Bogus Proclamation of 1864,” Journal of American 
History 89:3 (December 2002), pp. 869-899.  Lincoln quoted on p 869. 
iii See Blondheim, “’Public Sentiment is Everything,” p. 871. 
 
iv The evidence analyzed below is within The Valley of the Shadow:  Two Communities in 
the American Civil War (http://valley.vcdh.virginia.edu).  The Digital Scholarship Lab at 
the University of Richmond is creating tools to analyze the many hundreds of thousands 
of words in that archive and in others to follow.  Robert K. Nelson of the DSL has 
devised those tools and I am grateful to him for his remarkable work.  Readers may 
explore these tools and materials on their own at the website of the Digital Scholarship 
Lab. 
 Pioneering work in this vein appears in John Riedl’s 2006 University of Virginia 
dissertation, “Language and the Making of Race in the United States, 1827-1900,” 
available at http://wwwlib.umi.com/dissertations/fullcit/3225902.  Also see Rogan Kersh, 
Dreams of a More Perfect Union (Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 2001). 
v These correlates appear in the text mining tools in the Digital Scholarship Lab, where 
the most common pairs can be seen by entering a key word.  See illustration 9 below for 
an example. 
																																																								
	 19
																																																																																																																																																																					
 Some of the words appearing most commonly in the newspapers bear a strong 
resemblance to those James McPherson found in the letters of soldiers, described in For 
Cause and Comrades:  Why Men Fought in the Civil War (New York:  Oxford, 1998).  
The soldiers from Augusta and Franklin, like the sample in McPherson’s book, spoke of 
honor, duty, and courage.  Looking at the homefront as well as at soldiers’ letters shows 
that the communities from which these men came were also absorbed in the language of 
military duty and honor, that the political issues of the war were thoroughly situated in 
partisan political struggles, and that the values of duty and honor were broad enough to 
embrace North and South, Democratic and Republican.  These words, so charged and 
widely shared, clouded more concrete and contested kinds of motivations such as race, 
party, and military situation.  It is no accident that both sides clung to the words of honor 
and duty in generations following the war, for those words were both true and broad 
enough to obfuscate other motivations.  We need to study the universe of language more 
broadly and more rigorously to understand how all the pieces fit together.  
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vii Valley Spirit, October 8, 1862. 
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Crown, 1997), pp. 11-2. 
ix Valley Spirit, May 6, 1863. 
 
x Valley Spirit, July 20, 1864; Thurlow Weed, quoted in David E. Long, The Jewel of 
Liberty:  Abraham Lincoln’s Re-election and the End of Slavery (Mechanicsburg, PA.:  
Stackpole Books, 1994), p. 45. 
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xi For the larger context, see Adam I. P. Smith, No Party Now:  Politics in the Civil War 
North (New York: Oxford, 2006), which emphasizes the way that Lincoln used the 
Republican party but spoke in a patriotic language above party to avoid the limitations of 
partisan division.  
xii See Joel H. Silbey, A Respectable Minority:  The Democratic Party in the Civil War 
Era, 1860-1868 (New York:  W. W. Norton, 1977), pp. 239-40.  The unrelenting use of 
race by the Democrats is a major theme in the newest and most comprehensive account 
of Lincoln we have:  Michael Burlingame, Abraham Lincoln:  A Life (Baltimore:  Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2008). 
xiii Franklin Repository, April 25, 1860. 
 
xiv Michael Vorenberg, “’The Deformed Child’: Slavery and the Election of 1864,” Civil 
War History 47 (3):  240-57, quote on p. 240.  During the war, the word “slavery” fell to 
19th of the 19 key words in both the Republican and the Democratic newspapers of 
Franklin County. 
xv Franklin Repository, November 25, 1863.  Boritt, Gettysburg Gospel, 137-47.  The 
most influential portrayal of the role of Lincoln’s speech, with its sweeping argument 
explicit in its subtitle, is Garry Wills, Lincoln at Gettysburg:  The Words That Remade 
America (New York:  Simon & Schuster, 1992). 
 
xvi Franklin Repository, February 22, 1865. 
 
xvii Franklin Repository, February 8, 1865. 
 
xviii Valley Spirit, March 8, 1865.  A recent study by a political scientist has found that 
presidents’ words in general have less impact than we might imagine.  See George C. 
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Edwards III, On Deaf Ears:  The Limits of the Bully Pulpit (New Haven:  Yale University 
Press, 2003). 
xix		
“Negro” as percentage of key words in Northern newspapers 
 
Northern Republican Northern Democrat 
 
Prewar    14.3   21.4 
 
War    22.9   24.4 
 
Postwar   30.7   41.7 
 
xx Quoted in George M. Fredrickson, Big Enough to Be Inconsistent:  Abraham Lincoln 
Confronts Slavery and Race (Cambridge:  Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 126. 
